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Abstract
Technical issues pertaining to re-mailing and terminal dues are not within the scope of this
analysis. Similarly, no reference will be made to otherwise crucial aspects of the EC’s competi-
tion law arising from REIMS II and the matters that are currently being litigated in the European
Court of Justice. Our attention will focus on a potential conflict that has only recently been con-
sidered. This issue of legal compatibility relates to the necessity that terminal dues be measured
against the fundamental “Most-Favored-Nation” (“MFN”) principle of the World Trade Organiza-
tion (“WTO”) as provided by the General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”).
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INTRODUCTION
Terminal dues' have evolved from a simplified form of pay-
ment for weight imbalances in mail exchanges to a system that,
for the largest mail exchanges, provides payment for work per-
formed, as measured by the number of items delivered. At the
1994 Seoul Congress, the Universal Postal Union ("UPU" or
"Union") adopted the principle that payment for bulk or com-
mercial mail should be linked to the prices customers pay in the
country of delivery. This evolution followed the specific changes
that occurred in the market and in the regulatory environment.
One of these changes has been the sharp increase in the offering
and use of services such as hybrid mail,2 or re-mailing.
Re-mailing, in particular, involves the shipment of bulk mail
from one country ("A") to the national post office of another
country ("B"), where it is posted either back to country A, to
destinations within country B, or to destinations in a third coun-
try ("C"). These techniques are known, respectively, as ABA,
ABB, and ABC re-mailing.3 Re-mailing was introduced because
* Partner, O'Connor and Company, European Lawyers, Brussels, Belgium.
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authors would like to thank Professor Joel R. Reidenberg of the Fordham University
School of Law, Uta Klinkers of the European Commission, and Francesca Coratella of
Poste Italiane S.p.A. for their assistance and encouragement. The opinions expressed
in this Essay, however, are the authors' own.
1. Terminal dues are defined as the remuneration of universal service providers
for the distribution of incoming cross-border mail comprising postal items from an-
other Member State or from a third country.
2. A hybrid mail service is a new value added postal service that combines the
processing of communications in electronic form with the handling of normal physical
letters. This service has developed in response to technological change and increasing
competition from alternative methods of communication. However, at least at one
stage of the value chain of hybrid mail, traditional physical letters still exist and need to
be handled and, ultimately, delivered.
3. In the ABA re-mailing, the mail originating in Country A is transported by pri-
TERMINAL DUES UNDER THE UPU CONVENTION 737
postal costs and post office efficiency vary from country to coun-
try.
Re-mailing allows businesses that depend on bulk or direct
mail4 to purchase the most competitive and efficient service
from wherever they are located. Several postal operators, how-
ever, have argued that re-mailing constitutes an abuse of the ter-
minal dues mechanism by domestic senders who send their mail
items-which are generally addressed to addressees in the send-
ers' home country or to a third country-via a foreign postal
company where the postal costs are lower. These issues concern-
ing re-mailing and terminal dues recently have become the focal
points of attention and negotiation within the UPU and the Eu-
ropean Community ("EC"). The Commission for the European
Communities ("Commission") has been notified of an October
31, 1997 agreement on terminal dues among postal operators,
the Agreement for the Remuneration of Mandatory Deliveries of
Cross-Border Mails ("REIMS II"). Various cases also are pending
in the European Court of Justice.
Technical issues pertaining to re-mailing and terminal dues
are not within the scope of this analysis. Similarly, no reference
will be made to otherwise crucial aspects of the EC's competition
law arising from REIMS II and the matters that are currently be-
ing litigated in the European Court ofJustice. Our attention will
focus on a potential conflict that has only recently been consid-
ered. This issue of legal compatibility relates to the necessity
that terminal dues be measured against the fundamental "Most-
Favored-Nation" ("MFN") principle of the World Trade Organi-
zation ("WTO") as provided by the General Agreement on
vate companies to Country B and put into the postal system there in order to be sent via
the traditional international postal system back to Country A, where the final addressee
resides. ABB re-mailing occurs where mail originating in Country A is transported by
private companies to Country B and put into the postal system there for delivery to final
addressees in Country B. Finally, ABC re-mailing takes place when mail originating in
Country A is transported by private companies to Country B and put into the postal
system there for forwarding via the traditional international postal system to Country C,
where the final addressee resides.
4. Direct mail is a communication consisting solely of advertising, marketing, or
publicity material. It is comprised of an identical message, except for the addressee's
name, address, and identifying number, as well as other modifications that do not alter
the nature of the message. Direct mail is sent to a significant number of addressees, to
be conveyed and delivered at the address indicated by the sender on the item itself or
on its wrapping.
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Trade in Services ("GATS") .5
I. THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES
The 1994 GATS forms part of Annex 1 to the WTO Agree-
ment 6 and is a binding international agreement for all WTO
Members. It establishes a multilateral framework of principles
and rules to govern trade in services and commitments to liber-
alize existing barriers to trade and investment services. The
GATS is modelled after the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade,7 but the only fundamental obligation that the WTO
Members have undertaken with respect to all services is that of
the MFN treatment.' The commitments that individual Mem-
bers list in their Schedules determine the majority of GATS obli-
gations.
The GATS consists of three main elements. The first ele-
ment is a basic framework Agreement and includes the general
obligations and disciplines. The second element consists of a
number of Annexes to the Agreement that establish special or
different rules for particular types of services. The third element
consists of Schedules that set out each Member's specific market
access concessions.9
The fundamental obligations under the Agreement are split
between Parts II and III of the GATS. The disciplines found in
Part II, "General Obligations and Disciplines," generally apply to
5. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Multilateral Trade Negotiations
(The Uruguay Round): General Agreement on Trade in Services, Dec. 15, 1993, 33
I.L.M. 44 (1994) [hereinafter GATS].
6. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Multilateral Trade Negotiations
(The Uruguay Round): Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization
[World Trade Organization], Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 13 (1994).
7. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 STAT. A-3, 55
U.N.T.S. 187.
8. In general, Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment ("MFN") is trade treatment ac-
corded to the nation that is treated most favorably. The General Agreement on Trade
in Services ("GATS") states, "[w]ith respect to any measure covered by this Agreement,
each Member shall accord immediately and unconditionally to services and service sup-
pliers of any other Member, treatment no less favourable than that it accords to like
services and service suppliers of any other country." GATS, supra note 5, art. II, 1, 33
I.L.M. at 49. The interpretation of this provision is based on guidelines offered by
similar exercises conducted in the past with respect to MFN and MFN-type obligations
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
9. The basic framework Agreement itself does not provide for market access to any
particular service sector. Specific market access commitments only result from each
Member's GATS Schedule.
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all services covered by the GATS, regardless of whether a Mem-
ber has listed any specific service sector concession in its Sched-
ule. The provisions of Part III, "Specific Commitments," apply
only to those service sectors expressly mentioned in a Member's
Schedule.10
Articles I and XXVIII of the GATS provide definitions relat-
ing to the scope of the Agreement. The GATS applies to those
measures by Members affecting trade in services. Trade in serv-
ices is the supply of a service from each of the following: (1) the
territory of one Member into the territory of any other Member
(cross-border supply); (2) in the territory of one Member to the
service consumer of any other Member (consumption abroad);
(3) by a service supplier of one Member, through commercial
presence in the territory of any other Member (commercial pres-
ence); (4) or by a service supplier of one Member, through pres-
ence of natural persons of a Member in the territory of any other
Member (presence of natural persons).
The term "services" includes any service in any sector, ex-
cept for services supplied in the exercise of a governmental au-
thority. The exception is defined as any service that is supplied
neither on a commercial basis, nor in competition with one or
more service suppliers. For purposes of the GATS, "measures by
Members" are those taken by central, regional, or local govern-
ments and authorities, and by non-governmental bodies exercis-
ing powers delegated by such authorities.
Non-governmental measures and practices by private indi-
viduals or legal persons are outside the scope of the GATS. Cer-
tain restrictive business practices of service suppliers that restrain
competition and indirectly restrict trade in services, however, are
covered by Article IX of the GATS. This is the case for those
monopolies and exclusive services suppliers that are either au-
thorized or formally established by a WTO Member in a way that
substantially prevents competition in a particular service sector.
Article I of the GATS provides that governmental measures
need not restrict trade in services, but merely affect it." A "mea-
sure" is any measure by a Member, whether in the form of a law,
regulation, rule, procedure, decision, administrative action, or
10. Under the GATS, each Member need only grant market access and national
treatment to the services sectors of its choosing.
11. See GATS, supra note 5, art. I, 1, 33 I.L.M. at 49.
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any other form. The use of the term "affecting" reflects the in-
tent of the drafters to give a broad scope of application to the
GATS. The reach of the GATS is therefore widened to govern-
mental measures that directly or indirectly impact provisions of
services.
II. THE UNIVERSAL POSTAL UNION
The UPU, with headquarters in Berne, Switzerland, is the
specialized institution of the United Nations that regulates the
universal provision of postal services. 12 The Union has 189
member countries. The Constitution of the UPU 3 is the funda-
mental act containing the organic rules of the Union. It is a
diplomatic act that is ratified by the competent authorities of
each member country. The Constitution need not be renewed
for each Congress. Amendments to it can only be made in Con-
gress and are recorded in an Additional Protocol that is also sub-
ject to ratification.
The provisions relating to the application of the Constitu-
tion of the UPU and the operation of the Union are contained
in the General Regulations of the UPU. The Universal Postal
Union Convention14 ("UPU Convention") and its Detailed Regu-
lations provide the common rules applicable to the international
postal services and the provisions concerning the letter-post serv-
ices. They are binding on all member countries. Special Agree-
ments and their Detailed Regulations govern branches of the in-
ternational postal service other than the letter-post. They are
only binding on those countries that are parties to the Agree-
ments.
The Detailed Regulations of the UPU Convention are not
treaties. They are agreements concluded at the postal adminis-
tration level. The 1994 Seoul Congress transferred the power of
enacting and amending the Detailed Regulations to the Postal
Operations Council.
12. Postal services are the services involving the clearance, sorting, transport, and
delivery of postal items.
13. Constitution of the Universal Postal UnionJuly 10, 1964, 16 U.S.T. 1291, 611
U.N.T.S. 7, [hereinafter UPU Constitution].
14. Universal Postal Union Convention, July 11, 1952, reprinted in MANUAL OF THE
UNIVERSAL POSTAL CONVENTION 1.1 (International Bureau of the Universal Postal
Union 1995), available in <http://www.upu.int/manuals/an/Convention/conven-
tion.pdf> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
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The UPU holds a Congress every five years to review the
UPU Convention and its framework for the operational relations
between the various national postal administrations. Under the
UPU Convention, the members of the UPU agree to provide do-
mestic delivery services for incoming cross-border mail.15
III. APPLICABILITY OF THE GATS TO THE POSTAL SECTOR
AND TO SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS BETWEEN
POSTAL OPERATORS
Postal services are deemed to be covered by the GATS even
if, in light of the definition the GATS gives to "measures by
Members," the services provided by those postal operators that
are still governmental monopolies would seem to fall within the
exercise of governmental authority as defined by Article I of the
GATS.16 Postal operators are governmental monopolies only in
some countries. In others they have been fully or partly priva-
tized, or they may compete with private commercial operators in
some of their service areas. The postal operators are often
charged with the obligation of providing universal service and
are granted a monopoly (the reserved area) to be able to afford
it.
The issue of whether postal services fall under the GATS
cannot be clearly and affirmatively resolved by mere reference to
the Agreement and by interpreting its provisions. Nevertheless,
the GATS can definitely be considered to cover the bulk of the
services offered in the postal sector. In this respect, the UPU has
expressly stated that the "GATS applies to postal services. '1 7
A different question is whether the GATS applies to specific
agreements between postal operators, such as terminal dues
agreements. In these cases, the answer will first depend on the
specific service covered by the Agreement. It will also depend
on whether the particular service is neither supplied in the exer-
15. With respect to the scope and objectives of the Union, Article 1 of the UPU
Constitution provides that "The countries adopting this Constitution comprise, under
the title of the Universal Postal Union, a single postal territory for the reciprocal ex-
change of letter-post items. Freedom of transit is guaranteed throughout the entire
territory of the Union." UPU Constitution, supra note 13, art. 1, 16 U.S.T. at 1294, 611
U.N.T.S. at 64.
16. See GATS, supra note 5, art. I, 3(c), 33 I.L.M. at 49 ("A service supplied in the
exercise of governmental authority means any service which is supplied neither on a
commercial basis, nor in competition with one or more service suppliers.").
17. See UPU CA 1998-Doc.17, point 2.
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cise of governmental authority, nor in competition with one or
more service suppliers. As mentioned above, some of these
agreements are not concluded directly by the Member coun-
tries' respective governments, but rather by their postal opera-
tors. Consequently, there seems to be a number of arguments
on both sides regarding the question of whether, for example,
terminal dues are private arrangements outside the scope of gov-
ernmental measures, as provided by the GATS.
Continuing with the terminal dues example, it seems appro-
priate to refer to aJanuary 1999 working note18 by the Commis-
sion. This document reached the conclusion that there are two
possibilities for terminal dues under the GATS. First, they
"could be considered out of the scope of GATS if they are pay-
ments between operators and therefore they are not measures of
a Member in the GATS.""9 Second, "it could nevertheless be ar-
gued that since terminal dues are negotiated between WTO
Members in the UPU, the GATS may apply to them. '20
We have seen how the GATS broadly defines the concept of
a governmental measure to include action "in the form of a law,
regulation, rule, procedure, decision, administrative action, or
any other form."'2 1 At other levels, the assumption that GATS
obligations apply to terminal dues is clearly grounded in their
classification as governmental measures. For example, the
UPU's Postal Operations Council clearly stated that "compliance
with the WTO's Most-Favoured-Nation requirement would pre-
vent members from applying different terminal dues based on
the country of origin of mail, '22 and reached the conclusion that
several regional terminal dues proposals would have conflicted
with the MFN principle. This approach presupposes the applica-
bility of the GATS to terminal dues arrangements.
It is officially the Member governments, on behalf of the
individual postal operators, that agree to and are bound by the
terms of the UPU Convention. Their agreement is expressed
through acts that amount to governmental measures and that
18. Working Note on Postal/Courier Services Regarding the Preparation on GATS 2000,
DG1/M1/UK D(99), January 25, 1999.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See GATS, supra note 5, art. XXVIII, (a), 33 I.L.M. at 65.
22. UPU Postal Operations Council Document, World Round Table on Terminal
Dues, Geneva, February 3-4, 1999, CEP TR 1999.1-Doc.1.
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undermine the possible argument that the arrangements estab-
lished in the UPU framework are the results of postal operators
acting in non-governmental capacities. In the example of the
terminal dues arrangement, this approach leads to the conclu-
sion that the terminal dues regime, whether global or regional,
falls within the scope of applicability of the GATS.
For this reason, some legal instruments and mechanisms
agreed upon under the UPU Convention might be legally in-
compatible with certain rules and provisions of the GATS. Our
analysis will limit itself to those provisions of the UPU Conven-
tion that offer clear examples of this danger.
IV. TERMINAL DUES UNDER THE UPU CONVENTION AN
THE GATS: POSSIBLE CONFLICTS OF LAW
Prior to 1969, postal administrations did not directly com-
pensate each other for the delivery of international mail since it
was assumed that each mail item generated a reciprocal re-
sponse, resulting in a broad balance of traffic. This assumption
of equilibrium became obsolete, however, as imbalances devel-
oped and sharp differences in postal operators' costs and effi-
ciency were highlighted.
The UPU reacted to these developments in 1969 by intro-
ducing a mechanism that provided remuneration for the costs of
handling and delivering cross-border mail in the country of des-
tination. The fees that must be paid for these services are com-
monly referred to as "terminal dues." The method used con-
sisted of fixing a rate per kilogram that was the same for all pos-
tal operators concerned.
In practice, however, this system proved to be unsatisfactory
because it did not properly reflect the cost structures of the indi-
vidual operators. Furthermore, it was inherently flawed since it
ignored the real cost of delivery. For example, such a mecha-
nism could not account for the fact that it is cheaper to deliver
one item of mail weighing one kilogram than fifty letters weigh-
ing twenty grams each.
These inadequacies led the postal administrations of several
countries to call for changes. A number of European countries
worked out a different formula in the framework of the Euro-
pean Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administra-
tions. This was only one step forward, but no effective and relia-
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ble system ever resulted. At the EC level, several public postal
operators entered into two subsequent REIMS agreements,.
REIMS I in 1995 and REIMS II in 1997. REIMS I linked the
terminal dues to domestic tariffs on a European-wide basis and
REIMS II introduced a system of quality-of-service standards
used to calculate the terminal dues.
Two articles of the UPU Convention deserve careful analysis
to determine whether their provisions might be in conflict with
WTO principles or with specific rules of the GATS. They are
Article 25 on "Posting Abroad of Letter-Post Items" (which con-
cerns issues of re-mailing) and Article 49 on "Terminal Dues."
Paragraphs 1 through 3 of Article 25 of the UPU Conven-
tion allow for a postal administration to refuse to forward or de-
liver the so-called "ABA re-mailing" letter-post items. In particu-
lar, Article 25 provides that "[a] member country shall not be
bound to forward or deliver to the addressee the letter-post
items which senders residing in its territory post or cause to be
posted in a foreign country with the object of profiting by the
more favourable rate conditions there."2' Furthermore, "[t]he
administration of destination may claim from the sender and,
failing this, from the administration of posting, payment of the
internal rates."24 Paragraph 4 of Article 25 provides that a mem-
ber country C has the right to refuse to forward or deliver the
"bulk re-mail" posted in country B by residents of country A,
should an appropriate remuneration at the rate normally paid
by country A, but not at the lower rate paid by country B, not be
made.
Article 49 of the UPU Convention deals with terminal dues
and contains a number of provisions that would seem to be in
conflict with the GATS. In particular, paragraph 3 of Article 49
appears to grant preferential treatment to developing countries
in relation to the so-called "revision mechanism."25 Similarly,
paragraph 6 provides that "[a] ny administration may waive
wholly or in part the payment provided for under 1,1126 i.e., the
terminal dues, while paragraph 7 stipulates that "[t] he adminis-
trations concerned may, by bilateral or multilateral agreement,
23. Universal Postal Convention, supra note 14, art. 25, 1.
24. Id. 3.
25. Id. art. 49, 3.
26. Id. art. 49, 6.
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apply other payment systems for the settlement of terminal dues
accounts."27 The issues of compatibility of these two articles of
the UPU Convention with the GATS are easily identifiable and
trigger the question of whether this conflict of law can be cured
by reference to general principles of international law, by agree-
ment at the WTO or UPU level, or, eventually, through recourse
to WTO dispute settlement procedures.
In particular, Article 25 of the UPU Convention seems to be
inconsistent with GATS Article II on the MFN Treatment and
with Article VIII on Monopolies and Exclusive Service Suppliers.
In fact, although the right for a postal administration to refuse,
under Article 25 of the UPU Convention, to forward or deliver
"ABA re-mailing" letter-post items is optional, and seemingly not
per se in contrast with GATS, it may infringe the MFN principle
insofar as, in absence of any justification, country X could exer-
cise its right of refusal with respect to country Y and not towards
country Z. Such discrimination, even if merely theoretical,
would be clearly inconsistent with WTO and GATS rules. Fur-
thermore, if Article 25 were to be used by a WTO Member's pub-
lic postal operator to refuse re-mail, then it could conflict with
GATS Article VIII, which prohibits abuse of a dominant position
by monopolists outside the area of reserved services.28
Similarly, exercise of the right provided for by paragraph 4
of Article 25 would prove inconsistent with the MFN principle
and would amount to a breach of WTO and GATS commit-
ments. In fact, if country Z only allowed re-mailing from resi-
dents of X, it would unjustifiably discriminate between countries
X and Y. This difference in treatment would not be based on
costs, but instead simply would depend on the status of a country
as a re-mailer.
With respect to the preferential treatment that Article 49 of
the UPU Convention grants to developing countries, it should
be noted that the GATS does not provide an exception to MFN
based on developing country status. Therefore, the UPU Con-
vention can be interpreted as granting industrialized countries
27. Id. art. 49, 7.
28. See GATS, supra note 5, art. VIII, 2, 33 I.L.M. at 54 (providing that where
monopolist or exclusive service provider competes "either directly or through an affili-
ated company, in the supply of a service outside the scope of its monopoly rights and
which is subject to that Member's specific commitments, the Member shall ensure that
such a supplier does not abuse its monopoly position").
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treatment that is less than favorable than that for developing
countries. For this reason, this mechanism is another violation
of the MFN principle and of WTO law.
Along the same lines, paragraphs 6 and 7 of Article 49 are
potential infringements of GATS Article II, regarding MFN treat-
ment, insofar as an administration may waive the payment of the
terminal dues with respect to one country wholly or in part. Fur-
thermore, they are potential infringements to the extent that the
administration concerned may, by bilateral or multilateral agree-
ment, apply other payment systems for the settlement of termi-
nal dues accounts, again with respect to a specific country or
group of countries. These acts would clearly amount to unjusti-
fied discrimination and would put the UPU Convention in con-
flict with the GATS and WTO law.2 9
V. ISSUES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
In 1998, the UPU produced a document" ("UPU Memo")
regarding the obligations arising from the GATS in the interna-
tional postal context. The fundamental issue addressed by the
UPU in its memorandum was the legal relationship existing be-
tween the GATS and the UPU Convention. The UPU Memo re-
ferred to possible incompatibilities between GATS provisions
and Articles 25 and 49 of the UPU Convention. The Memo
reached the conclusion that, "in case of conflict between inter-
national treaties, it should be noted that the most recent agree-
ments generally prevail over older ones; similarly, special provi-
sions prevail over general ones."31 These two rules of public in-
ternational law are, respectively, Article 30 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties3 2 ("Vienna Convention") and
the so-called "lex specialis rule."
The first rule is derived from Article 30 of the Vienna Con-
29. GATS applies to bilateral or multilateral (regional) terminal dues schemes be-
cause such schemes are implemented on the basis of Article 49.7 of the UPU Conven-
tion, which is, by itself, a governmental measure in the sense of Article I, paragraph 3 of
the GATS. Since their implementation is conducted pursuant to the authority of a
governmental measure, terminal dues schemes would clearly fall within this definition.
30. "Obligations Arising from the General Agreement on Trade in Services"
(Agenda Item 8), Memorandum by the Secretary-General, Dec. 16, 1998, UPU Docu-
ment CA 1999-Doc. 8 [hereinafter UPU Memo].
31. Id.
32. Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 30, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 339 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
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vention and broadly states that, with respect to the general ques-
tion of the relationship of rights and obligations of States parties
to successive treaties relating to the same subject matter, the
more recent agreement prevails. In the case at hand, it is clear
that the subject matter of the two treaties is the same. On one
side, in fact, the general principles of the GATS, i.e., the MFN
treatment, apply to governmental measures affecting interna-
tional postal services; on the other side, the UPU Convention is
an intergovernmental agreement that also applies to interna-
tional postal services. Postal services are the partial and exclu-
sive subject matter of both the GATS and the UPU, respectively.
The result of the application of Article 30 of the Vienna
Convention to the relationship between the GATS and the UPU
Convention is that for each GATS/UPU Member State, a careful
analysis of when its respective rights and obligations under the
GATS and Congress' most recent revision of the UPU Conven-
tion were entered into force is necessary. That, along with the
fact that not all UPU parties are WTO/GATS Members, and that
both the GATS and the UPU Convention periodically are revised
legal instruments, would make it very difficult to establish, on a
country-specific basis, what treaty is most recent.
As for the second rule, the general principle is that when a
general and a more specific provision both apply at the same
time, preference must be given to the special provision. This
rule is not reflected in the Vienna Convention, but is an addi-
tional interpretative tool that occasionally is applied in public
international law.
In the case of the GATS/UPU conflict of law, the "lex
specialis rule" is merely supplementary to Article 30 of the Vi-
enna Convention. The first rule therefore must be read in con-
junction with the provision of Article 26 of the Vienna Conven-
tion. According to Article 26, each treaty must be interpreted
"in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light
of its object and purpose."3
In this regard, the context must be intended as the overall
WTO framework of international trade regulation and liberaliza-
tion. The GATS is one of the backbones of the WTO system,
while the UPU Convention, although adhered to by a larger
33. Id. art. 26, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 339.
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number of parties, can be considered as a multilateral agree-
ment that applies only to one major services sector, i.e., the pos-
tal services. The UPU purpose is a single objective, i.e., the crea-
tion and regulation of a global postal area, while the GATS pur-
sues the establishment of a multilateral framework of principles
and rules for trade in all services sectors.
In light of these considerations, it seems natural to reach
the conclusion that, insofar as the objects and purposes of the
WTO Agreement and the GATS are broader than those of the
UPU Convention, WTO and GATS provisions must prevail over
the conflicting rules of the UPU. This reasoning is reinforced by
the fact that the GATS did not exclude postal services from its
global and comprehensive competence, as was done for other
sectorial agreements. In this regard, the possibility that some
provisions of the UPU Convention be considered special under
the "lex specialis rule" and, as such, be given prevalence over
those of the GATS, seems a highly improbable conclusion.34
VI. LESSONS FROM THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR
Although postal services are very different in nature and in
their technological dimension from the telecommunications
services, a few considerations can be made with respect to the
WTO telecommunications negotiations. Until recently, in most
countries of the world, the telecommunications sector operated
under a legal monopoly where one or few operators held the
exclusive rights to provide telecommunications services. WTO
negotiations on the liberalization of this sector were only com-
pleted in February 1997.
In particular, the liberalization of the telecommunications
sector was completed through the publication of a Fourth Proto-
col attached to the GATS. One of the relevant traits of this pro-
cess was the circulation of a Reference Paper on regulatory prin-
ciples. As a result of this Reference Paper, almost all of the
countries participating in the negotiations agreed to enter into
additional commitments concerning regulatory principles appli-
cable to the sector.
The Reference Paper was drafted and agreed upon as a
non-binding legal document. The idea was to get all the differ-
34. The UPU Memorandum elaborated upon this argument. See UPU Memo,
supra note 30, 25.
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ent parties to agree on including, for the first time, pro-competi-
tive regulatory disciplines within the GATS. In fact, because of
the special features of the telecommunications markets, the
WTO Members involved in the negotiations agreed on the ne-
cessity to adopt pro-competitive regulatory rules in order to lib-
eralize the sector.
One of the successful features of the Reference Paper has
been its flexibility. In particular, it would have been impossible
to agree upon including the Reference Paper directly in an an-
nex on telecommunications services because the WTO Members
involved in the negotiations were not politically keen on adopt-
ing individual commitments to liberalize the sector if the regula-
tory principles were to be legally binding. In practice, however,
the Reference Paper has been adopted in its entirety, i.e., with-
out amendments or exceptions, by most of the countries that
scheduled individual commitments.
It should be noted that while negotiating the Reference Pa-
per, the WTO Members agreed to leave the established system of
accounting rates out of the scope of its regulatory principles.35
In addition, and more importantly, a "gentlemen's agreement"
was concluded to ensure that no WTO Member would challenge
the accounting rates system in existence at least until the next
round of multilateral trade negotiations in services. This ap-
proach could probably provide a sensible solution to a possible
WTO agreement on postal services that takes into account the
particular needs and concerns of postal operators with regard to
issues such as re-mailing and terminal dues.
CONCLUSION
Problems of compatibility between provisions of the UPU
Convention and rules of the GATS have started to arise and are
35. The rationale behind the decision to leave the established system of account-
ing rates out of the scope of the regulatory principles was that even though the account-
ing rates system contradicts the principles of trade liberalization embodied in the GATS
and specifically referred to in the Reference Paper, negotiators thought that the mere
liberalization of the national markets would automatically lead to the disappearance of
the accounting rates system as soon as other carriers would begin providing interna-
tional service connection outside the scope of the accounting rates system. An auto-
matic transposition of this reasoning to the postal services sector cannot occur because
of the sharp differences between the two sectors. It is clear, however, that the postal
services sector will eventually need to be granted similar derogations to the GATS liber-
alization process.
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bound to become serious issues of negotiation both at the UPU
level and during the upcoming GATS 2000 Round of Multilat-
eral Trade Negotiations on services. There might even be the
need for litigation under traditional principles of international
law to determine which body of rules has competence and prior-
ity with respect to postal services. A WTO Member might also
decide to refer the matter to a WTO panel operating in the
framework of the WTO dispute settlement procedures.
It seems clear from this analysis that there are potential and
real conflicts between the two agreements. The easier approach
would be for the UPU Congress to introduce a new clause in the
revision of the UPU Convention directly addressing its relation-
ship to the WTO Agreement. This would increase legal certainty
and provide the WTO with the legal basis and means to achieve
a comprehensive and equitable solution to the problems of ter-
minal dues and re-mailing. A realistic and fair solution, in fact,
would need to take into account the goals of developing coun-
tries and the objective differences in costs and quality of service
existing even among industrialized countries.
There are various approaches within the GATS to secure a
similar outcome. One possible avenue would be to reach a sort
of "gentlemen's agreement," as accomplished in the telecommu-
nications services sector, not to pursue litigation under WTO dis-
pute settlement procedures in cases of effective discrimination
caused by "WTO-illegal" UPU or bilateral rules on terminal dues
and re-mailing. This solution, however, would not be legally
sound and would not provide a high degree of reliability.
A more formal and legally binding alternative would be for
WTO Members to commit to a "peace clause" similar to the one
provided by Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture in the
area of agricultural subsidization. Such a mechanism has proved
quite successful, even though it has not solved the problem, but
merely postponed it. The legal security and reliability of such a
provision would be, however, much greater than the one offered
by a "gentlemen's agreement."
Another approach would be for WTO Members to adopt a
specific exception to the MFN principle for postal services and,
specifically, to take account of the peculiar aspects of re-mailing
and of the necessity for the terminal dues mechanism. This op-
tion seems difficult to support, as it would establish a very dan-
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gerous precedent in terms of the efficacy and reach of the MFN
principle.
Similarly dangerous-and not quite advisable-would be to
have the national postal operators, whether public or private,
rather than the governments, conclude a specific agreement on
terminal dues. This agreement would not necessarily be exempt
from W'TO rules and would, once again, create a dangerous and
legally complicated precedent. It would amount to a legal es-
camotage and not to a serious and lasting solution.
Another possible avenue that would need, however, to be
carefully weighed and conceived (under WATO rules and case
law), would be to agree to a postal tariff rate quota. Tariff rate
quotas are the mechanisms that provide a transition from a rigid
system of quantitative restrictions to one of pure tariffication in
agricultural trade. This transition has not been smooth, but at
least it is moving in the right direction.
With respect to terminal dues, a system could be devised
whereby countries are allowed to re-mail within an agreed-upon
limit or tonnage of mail-basically, a quota. Should this limit be
exceeded, additional duties would come into play and the termi-
nal dues would amount to the actual cost of mailing in the coun-
try of delivery. As mentioned previously, this system could prove
to be a step backwards in WTO terms and would probably be
difficult to manage, but could result in a practical solution to the
legal conflict between the GATS and the UPU. It would also be
an answer to the threat which re-mailing represents for the pos-
tal operators of many countries.
